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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RHEAD. HINDMARSH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
0. P. SKAGGS FOODLINER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 11160 
Brief of Defendant and Appellan~ 
0. P. Skaggs Foodliner 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
plaintiff when she fell after slipping on an accumulation of 
ice and snow alleged to have been on the driveway entrance 
leading to defendant's parking lot and place of business. 
DISPOSmON IN LOWER OOURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a Verdict and 
Judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the plaintiff's Judgment 
and Judgment in its favor, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMEN.r OF FACTS 
Defendant, a partnership, operates a grocery store on 
the Southwest corner of the intersection of 200 West Street 
and 100 North Street, Provo, Utah. As is evident from 
plaintiff's exhibits numbered 1 through 5 the North side 
of the store building is adjacent to the sidewalk on the 
South side of 100 North Street; there is an entrance to the 
store on the East side at the Northeast comer of the build· 
ing and an entrance on the South side at the Southeast 
corner of the building; a private sidewalk runs immediately 
along the East side of the store building and between this 
sidewalk and the public sidewalk on the West side of 200 
West Street there is a driveway ~iting onto 100 North 
Street with parking on either side; the first building im· 
mediately to the South of the store building is what is des-
ignated as Pete's T.V., along the North wall of which there 
are parking stalls for use of defendant's patrons and im· 
mediately to the North of which there is an entrance-exit 
from 200 West Street running in an East-West direction 
along the South side of the defendant's store building and 
between the parking stall areas along the North wall of 
Pete's T.V. and similar parking stalls along the South side 
of defendant's store building; and the Craghead's store 
building is shown to be on the East side of 200 West Street 
almost directly East of Pete's T.V. (TR. 6-18). 
Plaintiff, Rhea B. Hind.mru-sh, a woman in her mid· 
fifties, resides with her husband at 3235 North Canyon 
Road, Provo, Utah. During the afternoon of December 
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31, 1964, a cold clear day, plaintiff rode as a passenger in 
an automobile driven by her husband from their home in 
North Provo to the defendant's store for the purpose of 
purchasing groceries and transacting other business in 
town (TR. 77). Plaintiff's husband entered defendant's 
parking lot from 200 West Street and parked the car in 
one of the parking stalls immediately to the North of Pete's 
T.V. Repair building and toward the West end thereof. 
Plaintiff got out of the right side of the car, walked around 
to the rear of the same and walked along the back end of 
the family car and several ot!hers parked immediately to 
the North of Pete's T.V. Repair Easterly to the sidewalk 
on the West side of 200 West Street, then went to do some 
shopping in several stores along center Street arid then 
came back along the East side of 200 West Street to Crag-
head's Plumbing and Heating Company where she went 
in to get a calendar. Plaintiff then proceeded West across 
200 West Street tO!Wards the entrance to defendant's park-
ing lot (TR. 78-79) According to the testimony given by 
the plaintiff at the trial, when she was some eight or nine 
feet West of the West line of the public sidewalk running 
along the West side of 200 West Street and walking toward 
the South entrance to defendant's store building and while 
on the driveway immediately North of the parking stalls 
on the North side of Pete's T.V. Repair building, and while 
watching for cars in the area, she felt her foot slip and 
she fell to the ground whereupon she experienced a severe 
pain in the area of her left hip (TR. 80). Plaintiff testi-
fied that as she was walking toward the defendant's store 
just immediately prior to falling she was not watching the 
ground in front of her but was watching for cars in the 
parking lot area (TR. 80). She then testified that atirer 
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she ·had been helped to her feet by some boys and was 
standing in the area where she had fu.llen, she looked. down 
and sa:w a mound of ice with snow on it which mowid was 
two or three inches thick and about five or six inches wide 
(TR. 81). Plaintiff then testified rthat she made her way 
into the defendant's store where she was later joined by 
her husband. After doing some shopping she and her hus-
band .returned to their home where she immediately went 
to bed because af the. great pain she was e~riencing in 
the .area of her left hip (TR. 84). Plaintiff testified that 
she stayed in bed for several weeks thereafter and finally 
on or. about the 27th of February, 1965, went to see Doc-
tor. Eugene. Chapman because her injuries did not seem 
to be.-improving and.she .was experiencing_ a great deal of 
pain . .at .that time (TR. 86) . 
. Doctor Chapman .diagnosed a fracture of the left .fe-
moral. neck and. a. slight formation of cystic areas. on the 
femoral head (TR. 34). 
When :plaintiff's condition did not materially improve 
Doctor Chapman recommended an operation, and on De. 
cember 14, 1965, he performed a cup arthroiplasty on the. 
plaintifLat the Utah Valley Hospital (TR. 42). 
On cross-examination art the time of the. trial. plaintiff 
testified that after she got out of the family car at de-
fendant's parking lot she observed tihat there was snow 
everywhere all over the parking lot and that tJhere were 
ruts in the snow.(TR. 92). She.then proceeded East along 
the rear of the parked cars through the snow to the side-: 
walk on the West side of 200 West Street where there was 
no snow (TR. 94). Plaintiff then went .down town on the 
public sidewalk on which there was no snow; came back 
on the East side of 200. West Street on the public sidewalk 
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on which there was no snow; crossed 200 West Street 
on which there was no snow; proceeded acros.s the side-
walk on the West side of 200 West Street on which there 
was no snow; and entered upon the driveway into de-
fendant's parking lot, which entrance way and parking 
lot were completely covered with snow and full of car ruts 
(TR. 94-95). Plaintiff testified that she could not see any 
blacktop through 1Jhe snow in the area of the entrance way 
and the parking lot (TR. 95) , burt that she nevertheless 
walked onto the snow without looking down at her feet to 
see where she was going because she was looking for cars 
in the parking lot area (TR. 95-96). She did not recall 
seeing any cars moving towards her or behind her in the 
area, and she was !coking for them rather than looking 
down to see where she was placing her feet (TR. 96, 98, 
99) . Plaintiff testified that she just kept walking through 
the snow without looking at her feet, watching for cars, 
until she foll (TR. 97). It was not until after she had fal-
len and had been helped to her feet that she looked down 
and saw a mound of ice with snow' on it some two or three 
inches high and five or six inches wide (TR. 97) . 
The plaintiff further testified on cross-examination 
that she had not been at the defendant's store area from 
December 31, 1964, until the month of June, 1967, at which 
time she and her husband went back to the premises and 
pinpointed the spot at which she had fallen, said point be-
ing in the middle of the entrance way to defendant's park-
ing lot and approximately eight feet West of the West line 
of the public sidewalk running along the West side of 200 
West Street (TR. 98-99). 
In the deposition taken of plaintiff on .A:pril 14, 1967, 
the plaintiff testified she fell at a point which was closer to 
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the. south dooc of defendant's store than to the sidewalk 
(TR. 10.2) and that in the area behind the place where her 
husband had parked the car "it was wet, and it was slick, 
and there was snow" (TR 103) . Plaintiff said that she 
saw the mound of snow and ice, which was a pretty good 
sized one, before she stepped on it and that as she stepped 
on the top of the. mound herr foot slipped down the side of 
it and she fell to the ground (TR. 104). 
STATEMEN'.r OF POINTS 
POINT I 
.PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AND HER NEGLI-
GENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJUR-
IES. 
POINT Il. 
PLAINTIFF BY HER ACTIONS ASSUMED THE 
RISK OF ANY INJURIES SUSTAINED BY HER. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 TO THE JURY 
ERRED THiEREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT 
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DU-
TY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE FOR OWN SAFETY. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 35 TO THE JURY 
ERRED THEREBY IN TI!AT THE JURY WAS Norr 
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED REG.ARDiNG THE FACT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT .WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO 
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WARN TIIE PLAINTIFF AS A BUSINESS VISITOR 
OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECI'ED VER-
DICT AND FOR JU!DGMENT NO'IWITIISTANDING 
THE VERDICT SHOULD HlAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AND HER NEGLI-
GENCE WAS A PROXIMATE. CAUSE OF HER INJUR-
IES. 
It is the position of the defendant that the evidence 
in this case conclusively shows plaintiff was guilty of neg-
ligence herself as a matter of law, which negligence was a 
proximate cause of her alleged injuries. It is recognized 
that for the purpose8 of this appeal, a jury verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff having been entered in the court below, the 
evidence must be taken most favorably to the position of 
the plaintiff. However, whether the Court considers 1Jhe 
evidence and testimony of the plaintiff given at the trial 
or as given in her deposition, it appears that the most favor-
able interpretation of the same is that plaintiff knew that 
the parking lot was covered with snow and full of ruts and 
was slick; that the public side'Wa.lks and street running 
alongside of the parking lot was dry and free. of snow and 
ice; that the day was clear; that the plaintiff was a woman 
in her mid-fifties with no physical disabilities; and that 
plaintiff consciously entered upon the snow and ice in the 
parking lot without watching where she was putting her 
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feet because she claimed she was looking for traffic mov-
ing in the parking lot, although she did not see any traffic 
moving in the area for some 20 minutes after she had fal-
len. 
It is the defendant's contention that the case of McAL-
LISTER VS. BYBEE, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778 is deter-
minall\ie of this ca:se. Ln the McALLISTER case, ~he plain-
tiff, according to her testimony, tripped over a cement ob-
struction she had know about for years, and that the same 
was in plain sight on a clear day and was there to see if 
anyone had but looked. In its decision, this !Honorable 
Court cited the case of WHITMAN VS. GRANT, 16 Utah 
2d 81, 395 P.2d 918, and quoted the following language: 
.. The plaintiff is confrooted with the basic proposition 
that when there is a hazard which is plainly visible, 
. ordinarily one is charged with the duty of seeing and 
avoiding it. And if he fails to do so, it is concluded 
that be was negligent either in failing to look or in 
failing to heed what he saw." 
Mr. Ohief Justice Crockett in commenting on the 
above language made observations to the effect that the 
quotation as set out was not complete in that the GRANT 
case (supra) further held that "ordinarily one is ~ged 
with such a duty." Chief Justice Crockett observed, 
"But as was expl1ained in that opinion following the 
quoted language, if there are extenuating circumstan-
ces so that a person in the exercise of due care might 
fail to see or heed the hazard, it may be found that 
his conduct was not negligent." .· 
In the case now before the Court, the plaintiff woo.Id 
excuse her failure to see and look where she was walking 
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by the fact that she claims she was watching for traffic 
in the area. However, by her own testimony at the trial, 
there was no traffic moving and although she knew the 
parking lot was rutted, covered with snow and slick, she 
nevertheless failed to watch where she was s<tepping at all, 
~nd it was not until after she had fallen that she bothered 
to look specifically as the place where she had been step-
ping. Defendant contends that the language of the GRANT 
2·1se (sup:ca) does not e~tend so far as to excuse the plain-
tiff from the consequences of deliberately walking on an 
area which she knew to be dangerous without paying close 
attention to what she was doing. 
In the GRANT case (supra) a Motion for Summaey 
Judgment on the ground of contributory negligence was 
granted and affirmed where it appeared that the plaintiff, 
who had delivered merchandise to a department store, was 
directed to go down stairs and out the door to return to his 
truck and who went to the first door he saw, opened it and 
stepped orff backwards into an elevator shaft without tak-
ing a precautionary glance beyond the door. This Court 
in considering whether the plaintiff could be guilty of neg-
ligence for failing to see that which was evident, used the 
following language: 
"In order to justify holding that a jury que£.tion as to 
negligence exists, where injury has resulted from an 
observable hazard, it is essential that thEre be some-
thing which can be regarded as tending to distract 
the plaintiff's attention or to prevent him from seeing 
the danger, thus providing some reasonable basis for a 
finding that even though he exercised due care he could 
be excused from seeing and avoiding it. For example. 
in the recent case of OAMPBELL VS. SAFEWAY 
STORES (15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409) the plain-
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tiff stumbled over a box in the aisle of the defend-
ant's store which she ordinarily Ehould have seen_· 
However, she was a woman of s1omewhat advanced 
years, physically inflicted with impair€d. eye3ight, and 
most importantly, was preoccupled as she r 1eaEonably 
could be expected to be in searching the shelves for a 
certain item of food." 
In the present case, the plaintifff, according to her 
testimony at the trial, while claiming to watch the area foc 
moving cars, the presence of which could have been deter-
mined at a glance, nevertheless failed to observe at all the 
area where she was walking even though she knew that 
the ~ea was dangerous and slick by her own testimony. 
In the case above referred to CAMPBELL VS. SAFE-
WAY STORES (supra) where the plaintiff fell over the 
small box in the aisle of the store where she was shopping, 
the Court in commenting upon the matter of contributory 
negligence used the following language: 
''We agree that ordinarily one is guilty of contributoq 
negligence which will preclude recovecy if she fails to 
· see and give heed to a danger which is plain to be 
seen. However, as we have held on a number of oc-
casions, this rule is not applicable where there are ex-
tenuating circumstances which impair the ability to 
see the hazard. They were present in the instant case 
in that plaintiff's daughter was going ahead of her 
with the grocery cart, and that plaintiff was preoc-
cupied in searching the shelves for csrtain merchan-
dise. There is the further fact that it would not be 
unreasonable for one to proceed with at least some 
degree of assurance that these aisles are clear of im-
pediments. Under such circumsrtances it is our opin-
ion that a jury question existed· as. to wheth€'r. the 
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plaintiff was observing the standard orf care of an or-
dinary reasonable and prudent person for her own 
safety." 
Such case differs from the present one in that under 
the evidence in this case, the plaintiff knew that the dan-
ger was in front of her; that the parking lot . was full of 
ruts and was slick with ice and snow; and she nevertheless 
without even so much as a glance as to where she was 
walking, proceeded into the area and consequently slipped 
and fell. 
Further, in this case, the diversion claimed.by plaintiff 
was more imaginary than reial. She was merely looking 
for traffic, which by her own testimony was non-existent 
at the time. As held by this Court in the case of EISNER 
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, 120 Ut. 675, 238 P.2d 416: 
"Plainly, according to the authorities, the cause divert-
ing a pede.strian's attention from a known danger 
must be unexpected and substantial ... " 
In this case there r€ally was no diveTsion at all. When 
the plaintiff cho;;e to walk onto the snow packed, rutted 
and slick parking lot, plainly visible, and its condition known 
to her, she either saw the condition before her or she did· 
not. If she looked she must have seen it and deliberately 
or negligently stepped onto it. If she did not look she neg-
lected her duty in traversing the parking lot entrance way. 
ROTH V. VERONA BOROUGH, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689. 
Either action on the part of plaintiff was negligence and a 
proximate cause of: h~ injuries. lt.llLLIGAN VS. CAPI ... 
'J'OL FURNITURE CO., 8 Ut. 2d 383, 335 P.2d .~J9. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIF1F BY HER ACTIONS ASSUMED THE 
RISK OF ANY INJURIES SUSTAINEID BY HER. 
On the question of assumption of risk, reference is 
made to the case of CDA.Y VS. DUNFORD, 121 Utah 177, 
239 P.2d 1075, wherein this Court stated and approved the 
following language: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk is confined to cases 
where the plaintiff not only knew and appreciated the 
danger, but voJuntarily put himself in the way of it 
and that the essential elements of assumed risk are 
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a spe-
cific defect or dangerous condition caused by the neg-
ligence of a defendant in the violation of some duty 
orwing to the plaintiff, together with the plaintiff's 
appreciation of the danger to be encountered and his 
voluntary exposure of himself to it." 
.. In the inst.ant case the plaintiff knew full well that 
the parking lot was rutted, snow covered, slick and by her 
own testimony dangerous, but she nevertheless chose to 
walk upon it without taking any precaution whatsoever 
to look at her feet as to where she was going, choosing 
rather to be looking a:bout for cars in the area which might 
be moving, although none were evident and that fact could 
have been determined by a very cursory glance, so that 
plaintiff could have easily waitched where she was walking 
without endangering herself to being hit by moving traffic 
in the area. Certainly traffic moving in the ·area would be 
moving very slowly and would not constitute nearly so 
much danger to her as would falling upon the slick and 
rutted surf ace. 
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Reference is made to the california case of LEWIS 
VS. COUNTY OF CONmA COSTA, 278 P.2d 756, which 
is cited as an authority in the JURY INSTRUCTION 
FORMS FOR UTAH, page 59, in which case !it was held 
that a mail carrier who in crossing a street in the middle 
of a block jwnped over a mud-filled gutter onto a mud· 
covered sidewalk which he lmew would be slippery when 
he could have avoided the muddy area by retracing his 
steps 100 feet or so, ~urned the risk of injury or was con-
tributorily negligent rin so jumping and therefore was not 
entitled to recover for injuries sustained when he slipped 
and fell on the mud-covered walk. The California court 
commented as follows: 
"The facts demonstrate that plaintiff actually knew or 
must have known of the hazard. He testified that he 
knew of the presence of mud in the gutter and on the 
sidewalk and that mud ·was slippery. Yet, instead of 
going beyond the point of hazard or of retracing hls 
steps a mere 100 feet or so to a point where he :bad 
last crossed the street without difficulty. he took a 
chance and jumped wi1Jh .the untoward results already 
narrated. In explanation he said he did not at the 
time know how thick the mud on the sidewalk was, 
suggesting that in the absence of such lmowledge he 
was not fully aware of the hazard. We do not see 
the logic of that argument. He was thoroughly aware 
that mud covered the sidewalk and it was slippery. 
That would seem sufficient to put any adult person 
upon actual notice of the hazard. Where the facts 
are such that plaintiff must have had knowledge of 
the hazardous situation it is equivalent to actual knowl-
edge." 
Another feature of the doctrine of assumption of risk 
is that the assumption of risk must be voluntary. Refer-
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ence is made to the JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR 
UTAH, Form 17 .3 at Page 60, which states: 
"Before assumption of risk will bar reoovery it must 
be voluntary. To be voluntary these two factors m~t 
be present: First, the person in question must have 
actual knowledge of a danger or the conditions must 
be such that she would have such knowledge rif she ex-
ercised ordinary care. Second, she must have freedom 
of choice. 'J1his freedom orf choice must come from 
circumstances that provide her a reasonable oppor-
tunity, without violating any legal or moral duty to 
safely refuse to expose herself to the danger in ques-
~- ... tion~"' 
In the present case the plaintiff testified that she did 
1.alow of the existence of the danger from the snow and ice 
which was on the parking lot. She had the freedom of 
choice in that by her own testimony the public sidewalk 
-was free and clear of snow so that she could have easily 
entered the north door of defendant's store by walking 
along the dry public sidewalk without exposing herself to 
apy of the hazards of the snow and ice which she described 
as being present upon the parking lot which she chose 
to cross. 
;f)~endant contends that the evidence is uncontradic-
ted to the effect that the plaintiff voluntarily put herself 
in a position of danger of which she was aware when she 
h.ad another alternative which was easily available to her 
and which would have been completely safe for her to 
pursue. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 W THE JURY 
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ERRED TH!EREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT 
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DU-
TY TO EXERCISE DUE CARE FOR OWN SAFETY. 
The plaintiff in this case testified that she knew of 
the existence of the snow and ice which she claimed to be 
on defendant's parking lot and that the same was slick and 
dangerous. It is defendant's contenti011J that under such 
circumstances the obligation and duty of the plaintiff to 
exercise ordinary care for her safety is greater than would 
be the case if the plaintiff were not aware of the existence_ 
of such dangerous circumstances. Defendant requested 
the following instruction: 
No. 6 (R68) 
"You are instructed that inasmuch as the amolint of 
caution used by. the ordinary prudent person -varies -
in direct proportion to the danger known to. be in-_ 
volved in her undertaking, it follows that in the ex'." 
ercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution required -
will vary in accordance with the nature of the act and 
the surrounding ciTcumstances. To put the ma~ 
in another way, the amount of cautioo required by 
the law increases as does the danger that reasonably 
should be apprehended. Thus in this case if you find 
that the plaintiff knew oc in the exercise of rea.SOn- -
able care should have known that the area over which 
she was traveling was slick, the standar-d of <.>are im-
posed by law upon the plaintiff for her safety would 
be increased proportionately." 
The Court gave the following instruction, No. 16, to 
the jury: (R31) 
"The plaintiff in this case had a duty to make -ll. rea-
sonable observation along the path she moved at the 
time she __ passed from the sidewalk_ and stepped into 
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the rpath she chose to take and if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the plaintiff did not make a 
reasonable observation of the premises as she moved 
along and that she knew or should have known of the 
peril that there existed, and by the exercise of due 
care she could have avoided the peril of her falling, 
but failed to exercise due care to avoid said peril, then 
the plaintiff was negligent." 
·The instruction requested by the defendant was taken 
from JURY INSTRUCTION FORMS FOR UTAH, No. 
15.3, page 48, and the court's refusal to give such instruc-
tion as requested was excepted to by the defendant (TR. 
165). 
Since the plaintiff testified that she was aware of the 
existence of the snow and ice on the parking lot and that 
it was slick, defendant feels that it was entitled to an in-
struction which specifioally called the attention of the jury 
to the fact that the obligation of a person under such cir-
cumstances is greater than ordinarily would be the case 
and that the obligation to exercise ordinary care for one's 
safety increases in direct proportion to the danger known 
to be involved. In this case the plaintiff knew of a dan-
gerous condition and conseqrmtly her obligation to exer-
cise due care for her own safety was patent. 
POINT IV 
_ THE COURT IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 35 TO THE JURY 
ERRED THEREBY IN THAT THE JURY WAS NOT 
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED REGARIDING THE FACT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO 
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WARN THE PLAINTIFF AS A BUSINESS VISITOR 
OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER. 
In this case the plaintiff was a business. visitor to the 
premises of the defendant. By the testimony of the. plain-
tiff herself the entrance way and parking lot of the defend-
ant's premises over which the plaintiff would be obliged 
to travel if she were to enter the south door of the store 
building were covered with snow and ice, were rutted and 
were slick. The defendant requested instruction No. 35 
(unnumbered page in rthe ra."000. between .pages. 97 and 98) 
asking the court to instruct the jury in part as follows: 
"However, the responsibility of one having control of 
the premises is not absolute. It is not that of an in• 
surer. If there is danger attending upon the entry 
to the premises, the owner is entitled . to_ assume that _ 
a business visitor will perceive that which would. be 
obvious to her upon the _ordinary use of her own senses. 
There is no duty on the part of an owner to give a 
businss visitor notice of an obvious danger." 
This instruction was taken from UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR UTAH, Form 43.10, page 119.- aIJ4. 
the refusal of the court to give this instruction was duly 
excepted to by the defendant (TR. 166). 
The court lbelow g~ve its instruction No. 12 ·.· (R. 28) 
to the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that the plaintiff in this case was· 
a business visitor upon the. premises . occupied .. by. the 
defendant. You are instructed one who extends to a 
business visitor an invitation, express or implied,, is 
obliged to· refrain from acts of' negli~nce .and ·to ~· 
ercise ocdinary care to· keev the premises m · a· condi-· -
tion reasonably safe for the .business _of the visitor. In 
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the absence of appearances that would otherwise cau-
tion a reasonable prudent person in a like position to 
the contrary, a business visitor has the right to assume 
that the premises which she was invited to enter are 
reasonably safe for the purposes for which the invi-
tation was extended and to act on that assumption. You 
are instructed that the employees of the defendant 
have a duty to warn the plaintiff of danger of which 
they were aware of which the plaintiff had no knowl-
edge." 
The evidence is clear from the testimony of the plain-
tiff herself that she in fact did know of the danger that 
existed upon the parking lot and by her description of the 
situation the condition was perfectly obvious so that the 
court's _instruction to the jury to the effect that the de-
fendant was under a duty to warn the plaintiff of danger 
of whioh the plaintiff had no knowledge was inappropriate 
and it was error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury 
as requested by the defendant that the defendant was not 
under any duty to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the 
obvious danger which she described and of which she ac-
tually was very much aware. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIREcrED VER-
DICT AND FOR JU\DGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT SHOULD HiA VE BEEN GRANTED. 
, At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the de-
fendant, pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, moved the court for a directed ver-
dict on the grounds that the evidence of the plaintiff showed 
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent and that 
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such negligence was a proximate cause of her injury and 
further that the plaintiff by undertaking to walk. !in the 
parking lot area without watching where she was placing 
her feet, assumed the risk of injury by reason of her knowl-
edge of the dangerous condition therein existing according 
to her own testimony. Defendant's motion was denied by 
the court (TR. 111). 
At the close of all of the evidence the defendant again 
renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the same. 
grounds, which motion was denied by the court (TR. 125). 
Thereafter and within ten days after the reception 
of the verdict the defendant moved the court pursuant to 
Rule 50(b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in its favor on 
the grounds hereinabove referred to and as therein stated 
(R. 109). 
Defendant believes that these motions should have 
been granted and that the court erred in failing to do so 
for the reason that the plaintiff wru; negligent as a matter 
of law whioh was a proximate cause of her injuries and 
that the plaintiff further assumed the risk of injuries by 
reason of her conduct in entering upon the parking lot and 
entrance way of the defendant without watching where she 
was placing her feet, knowing of the dangerous condition 
thereon existing and an alterative route being available to 
her which would have been safe and free from danger. 
The arguments set forth in Points I and II above are 
hereby refrred to and adopted as a part hereof. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering all evidence and testimony in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, such evidence and testi-
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mony nevertheless shows as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff was negligent and that such egligencn was a proximate 
cause of her injuries and that the plaintiff further assumed 
the risk of injury by reason of her conduct in entering up-
on the parking lot of the defendant under the conditions 
which existed. The court below erred in failing to direct 
a verdict in favor of the defendant and in failing to grant 
the . defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
The judgment below should be reversed and judgment 
of no cause of action should be granted by this Court, in 
favor of the defendant, 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, PAULsON & TAYLOR 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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